



Adobe Inc.

ADBE

EQUITY RESEARCH REPORT

September 07, 2026

ADBE — Adobe Inc.

Report Date: 2026-09-07

Analyst: Moschovakis Capital Research

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Metric	Value
Recommendation	**HOLD / WATCHLIST**
Current Price	**\$266.51 USD / €229.28 EUR**
Fair Value (Base Case)	\$276.58 USD / €237.94 EUR
Margin of Safety	3.8%
Target Entry (HOLD)	\$220.00 USD / €189.27 EUR

Return Profile

Metric	Value
Dividend Yield	0.0%
Expected Dividend Growth	N/A
Expected Price Appreciation (10-yr base)	10.67% CAGR
Total Expected Return (Base)	10.67% CAGR
Bear Case Total Return	0.76% CAGR
Bull Case Total Return	14.84% CAGR
Probability-Weighted Return	9.24% CAGR

Risk Assessment

Metric	Value
Wealth Preservation Score	68 / 100
Downside Protection Score	60 / 100
Quality Score	63 / 100
Risk Level	MODERATE
Probability of >50% Loss	<10%
Recession Profile	SENSITIVE

One-Line Thesis:

Adobe owns a durable subscription franchise with dominant creative-software share and high returns on invested capital, but the zero dividend, AI-transition uncertainty, leadership succession, and modest margin of safety make the stock a watchlist candidate at \$266.51 rather than a new capital-preservation buy.

INVESTMENT THESIS

Adobe runs one of the most recognizable software franchises in the world. Its value proposition is not a single product but an integrated platform across creative expression, document productivity, and customer experience management. The supplied research shows that over 95% of revenue comes from subscriptions, which produces recurring cash flow that underwrites the balance sheet. The company historically reported three segments: Digital Media, Digital Experience, and Publishing and Advertising. In the first quarter of fiscal 2026 management combined those segments into a single reportable segment to reflect unified selling motions and integrated product innovation. That change does not alter the economics; it tells you management is reorganizing around an integrated AI-era platform push.

The core quality signal is the last five-year ROIC of 28.00% against an estimated cost of capital of 10.31%. That spread is exceptional for a business of Adobe's size. Morningstar rates the moat as wide, and Adobe holds over 70% of the creative software market. Creative Cloud products such as Photoshop, Premiere Pro, and Illustrator carry deep switching costs for professional users, because workflows, files, plugins, and team collaboration are locked into the Adobe ecosystem. Document Cloud, anchored by Acrobat and Sign, provides a second recurring-revenue engine. Digital Experience, roughly one quarter of revenue, targets enterprise marketing and customer experience budgets.

The problem for a wealth-preservation investor is that this quality does not remove the transition risk. Adobe is in a high-stakes freemium pivot. The company is trading near decadal valuation lows for a reason: investors are not certain Adobe can monetize generative AI before AI-native competitors erode its pricing power. Canva commands over 260 million users on the prosumer front. The freemium ARR headwind is roughly \$500 million, and Adobe lowered ARR guidance while CEO Shantanu Narayen announced his retirement. The stock trades at \$266.51, just below the Yahoo Finance average price target of \$276.58, so the market is not offering a meaningful discount to analyst consensus.

The base case still clears the required hurdle. If earnings per share grow at the projected 10.67% five-year CAGR and the trailing P/E of 15.57 holds, price appreciates about 10.7% annually with no dividend. That is above the Inflation plus 4% target of roughly 7%. But the bear case barely clears zero. Under a 3% EPS growth scenario and a terminal P/E of 12.5, the ten-year total return is about 0.76% annualized. A 25% probability assigned to that case leaves a thin cushion. The near-term picture adds pressure: earnings land on September 10, 2026, three days after this report, and the lowest analyst target is \$190, a 28.7% drawdown from the current price.

The wealth-preservation mandate requires you to answer how much you can lose before asking how much you can gain. Adobe's downside is limited by its subscription base, strong free cash flow, and low debt-to-equity of 47.53%, but it is not capped in the way a dividend-paying defensive business would be. You receive no income while you wait. The \$25 billion buyback authorization improves per-share economics, and the five-year share count has compounded down at 2.32% annually. That is real capital return, but it does not replace cash in your pocket.

Adobe is a hold and watchlist position, not a buy at the current quote. The company meets the quality standard, clears the base-case return hurdle, and has a durable moat. But the margin of safety to the consensus fair value is only 3.8%, below the 10% required for a new capital-preservation buy. A patient entry near \$220, or a post-earnings confirmation that free users are converting to paid at an acceptable rate, would change the calculus. You are paid to wait for evidence, not to underwrite a transition that is still unproven.

1. BUSINESS QUALITY ASSESSMENT

Adobe operates at the intersection of creative software, document productivity, digital marketing, and customer experience management. Its value proposition is to empower creative expression across media types and channels through an end-to-end platform spanning ideation, creation, production, and activation. The subscription model is the foundation. More than 95% of revenue is recurring, which reduces the cyclical sensitivity in the core creative and document franchises. Fiscal 2024 revenue was \$21.51 billion per Umbrex, although the supplied packet does not reconcile that figure cleanly with the current price or share count.

Historically Adobe split results into Digital Media, Digital Experience, and Publishing and Advertising. Digital Media commanded roughly 70% of total revenue and included Creative Cloud and Document Cloud. Digital Experience contributed about a quarter of revenue, and Publishing and Advertising represented about 1% of fiscal 2024 revenue. In the first quarter of fiscal 2026, Adobe combined these into one reportable segment. Management cited changes in how it evaluates results and allocates resources, reflecting unified selling motions and integrated product innovation. For an investor, this reduces segment-level disclosure and forces a higher reliance on total company KPIs.

The moat rests on professional workflow lock-in. Adobe holds over 70% of the creative software market, and Morningstar rates its moat as wide. Design, video, and publishing professionals have built careers around Adobe file formats, plugins, libraries, and collaboration tools. Moving to a competitor is not a simple price decision; it carries retraining costs, workflow disruption, and compatibility risk. The last five-year ROIC of 28.00% against a 10.31% cost of capital confirms the moat can still translate into economic profit. Projected operating margin of 46.04% and projected five-year revenue CAGR of 8.69% reflect a mature but profitable core.

The quality signal weakens when you examine the revenue trajectory. Q4 FY2025 revenue was \$6.19 billion, up 10.5% year over year. Digital Media annualized recurring revenue reached \$19.2 billion against an estimate of \$19.18 billion. Digital Media revenue was \$4.62 billion versus a \$4.54 billion estimate, up 11.5%. Digital Experience revenue was \$1.52 billion versus a \$1.51 billion estimate, up 8.9%. That is a solid but not spectacular growth profile. The most recent quarter reported, FQ2 2026, showed EPS of \$5.96 versus a consensus of \$5.82 and revenue of \$6.62 billion versus \$6.45 billion. The earnings beat pattern is intact, but the freemium pivot is deliberately suppressing near-term ARR growth.

The strategic question is whether Adobe's user-acquisition engine can convert into paid revenue. Creative monthly active users grew 70% year over year, and the free offering now exceeds 90 million users. That top-of-funnel growth is real, but the monetization path remains unproven. Adobe's freemium ARR headwind of approximately \$500 million is a deliberate investment. If the free users convert, Adobe expands its addressable market and defends against Canva and other AI-native entrants. If they do not convert, Adobe has traded near-term recurring revenue for a user base that does not pay.

Business quality for wealth preservation is high, but not unimpeachable. The brand, switching costs, and profitability are durable. The issue is that Adobe is now competing against a new category of AI-native tools

where the value proposition is faster, cheaper, and simpler. Adobe's response is to integrate Firefly and other AI features into the existing suite, while keeping data trained on licensed content. That preserves the professional workflow advantage, but it does not eliminate the prosumer and lower-end threat.

You can understand the business clearly, the sector is not in secular decline, and the competitive position remains broad. The quality assessment is therefore a pass. The deterioration risk is manageable for now, but it is not negligible, and that distinction matters for the final decision.

2. FINANCIAL FORTRESS ANALYSIS

The solvency test is the first gate for capital preservation. Adobe's debt-to-equity ratio of 47.53% translates to 0.475, which is below the preferred threshold of 0.5. Moody's assigns an A1 credit rating. Adobe carries investment-grade access to capital and generates substantial free cash flow. The price-to-free-cash-flow ratio of 10.68 implies a free cash flow yield of 9.36%, and the price-to-operating-cash-flow ratio of 10.48 confirms operating cash flow is strong relative to the market price. These figures indicate a balance sheet that can survive a severe downturn.

The interest coverage ratio is not supplied in the research packet, which prevents a complete solvency certification. The framework requires interest coverage above 5.0 for comfort and above 8.0 for preferred treatment. You cannot verify that metric from the provided data. The current ratio and debt maturity schedule are also missing. Without those inputs, you cannot assign the highest FORTRESS rating. The available evidence supports an ADEQUATE rating: low debt-to-equity, A1 credit, high margins, and positive free cash flow.

Earnings quality is high. The price-to-operating-cash-flow ratio of 10.48 is lower than the trailing P/E of 15.57, which means operating cash flow exceeds net income on a per-share basis. That is the expected relationship for a subscription business that collects cash upfront and earns revenue over time. The supplied SEC filing summaries report no auditor warnings, no going-concern issues, and no material risk-factor changes in the most recent filing. The management discussion and analysis tone is positive. There are no disclosed accounting irregularities or restatements in the data.

Dilution is a positive. The five-year shares outstanding CAGR is negative 2.32%, meaning Adobe has been retiring shares faster than it issues them. The \$25 billion buyback authorization announced in mid-2026 reinforces that trajectory. A buyback yield of 5.84% adds a meaningful per-share tailwind. The framework treats annualized dilution below 1% as excellent, and Adobe is at negative 2.32%. The source of the reduction is consistent net share repurchase activity, not a temporary financial engineering event.

The stress test must account for a software business with high fixed development costs and a subscription revenue base. If revenue dropped 30% for two years, Adobe would likely remain solvent. The subscription base would cushion the decline, and the high gross margins mean the company could reduce sales and marketing spend to protect margins. The missing interest coverage ratio introduces uncertainty, but the A1 rating and low debt-to-equity suggest Adobe can service its debt. The company would likely maintain positive free cash flow in a recession, though it has no dividend to preserve.

The financial fortress is adequate but not independently verifiable as a fortress because key balance sheet inputs are missing. The positive signals are the low debt load, A1 rating, high FCF yield, and consistent share count reduction. The data gaps are not disqualifying, but they prevent a definitive maximum-confidence solvency rating. You should monitor the debt maturity schedule and interest coverage when the next 10-Q or 10-K supplies those disclosures.

3. DIVIDEND ANALYSIS

Adobe pays no dividend. The company returns capital entirely through share repurchases. Because there is no dividend, the dividend sustainability scoring does not apply, and the income reliability component of the Wealth Preservation Quality Score is zero. The \$25 billion buyback program and the 5.84% buyback yield are the only cash-return mechanisms available to shareholders.

4. VALUATION ANALYSIS

Adobe trades at \$266.51 against a five-year historical average P/E of 36.49 and a three-year average of 32.40. The current trailing P/E of 15.57 is therefore far below Adobe's own history. The US software industry average P/E is 30.9, so Adobe appears cheap relative to both its own past and the sector. The forward P/E from one source is 10.50, and the EV/EBITDA is 11.44. P/FCF is 10.68, P/S is 4.36, and P/B is 9.43. The PEG ratio is 0.75. The free cash flow yield is 9.36%, the earnings yield is 6.58%, and the buyback yield is 5.84%.

The apparent cheapness needs to be read in context. The valuation has collapsed because the market is pricing in the AI transition risk and the freemium ARR headwind. The public.com P/E progression shows the ratio fell from 19.95 on January 2, 2026, when the price was \$333.30, to 12.07 on July 1, 2026, when the price was \$210.98, then partially recovered to 16.36 by September 1, 2026. The current trailing multiple of 15.57 sits near that recovered level. Valuation compressed 40% in six months, which tells you the market has already discounted much of the execution risk.

Analyst price targets are clustered near the current quote. StockAnalysis reports an average target of \$270.61, about 1.5% above the current price. Yahoo Finance lists an average of \$276.58, with a low of \$190 and a high of \$380. MarketBeat shows a consensus target of \$270.96 with a Hold rating. Barclays on September 3, 2026 maintained Equal-Weight and raised its target from \$250 to \$295. The consensus rating is Hold, not Buy, which reflects the market's split between the quality of the franchise and the uncertainty of the transition.

The margin of safety depends on which fair value you use. Against the Yahoo consensus target of \$276.58, the margin of safety is only 3.8%. That does not meet the 10% threshold required for a new buy under this framework. If you instead apply Adobe's current trailing P/E of 15.57 to the fiscal 2026 consensus EPS of \$19.08, you get a fair value of \$297.08, a margin of safety of 11.5%. That is more constructive but still not a wide margin. The truth probably lies between those figures. The market is not offering the wide discount to intrinsic value that a wealth-preservation investor should demand when the business is in transition and pays no dividend.

Adobe's valuation is reasonable, not compelling. The stock is cheap relative to its history and the sector, but history does not include the existential risk of generative AI. The current price sits just below the average analyst target, and the upcoming earnings report on September 10, 2026 introduces binary event risk. Valuation therefore supports a hold and watch the entry trigger, not an immediate purchase.

5. SCENARIO ANALYSIS

The ten-year total return model uses current trailing EPS of \$17.12, derived from the current price of \$266.51 divided by the trailing P/E of 15.57. Adobe pays no dividend, so the entire return comes from price appreciation driven by earnings growth and multiple change.

Bear Case (25% weight): EPS grows at 3.0% annually, reflecting recession pressure, AI monetization failure, and freemium ARR drag. Terminal P/E contracts to 12.5, near the July 2026 low. Ten-year EPS becomes \$23.01, and the price target is \$287.60. The annualized total return is 0.76%. The bear case preserves nominal capital over a decade but produces a return far below the hurdle rate.

Base Case (50% weight): EPS grows at the projected five-year CAGR of 10.67%, which includes the buyback tailwind. Terminal P/E holds at the current 15.57. Ten-year EPS becomes \$47.18, and the price target is \$736.02. The annualized total return is 10.67%.

Bull Case (25% weight): EPS grows at 12.0% annually, and the multiple re-rates to 20.0 as AI monetization succeeds. Ten-year EPS becomes \$53.17, and the price target is \$1,063.40. The annualized total return is 14.84%.

Scenario	10-Yr Price Target	Total CAGR	Weight	Contribution
Bear	\$287.60	0.76%	25%	0.19%
Base	\$736.02	10.67%	50%	5.34%
Bull	\$1,063.40	14.84%	25%	3.71%
Probability-Weighted				**9.24%**

The probability-weighted expected return of 9.24% clears the Inflation plus 4% target of roughly 7%. But the bear case is the critical test for this framework. At 0.76% annualized, the bear scenario is barely positive. A slightly more pessimistic EPS growth assumption of 2.5% would push the bear case negative. The protection in the bear case rests on the subscription base holding revenue flat enough to keep earnings growing, and on the multiple not falling further than 12.5.

The near-term picture is more severe than the ten-year model suggests. The lowest analyst target of \$190 implies a 28.7% drawdown from the current price. Adobe already fell from \$333.30 on January 2, 2026 to \$210.98 on July 1, 2026, a decline of 36.7% in six months. That demonstrates the stock can lose a third of its value during a transition. A 25% probability assigned to a 28.7% near-term loss contributes roughly 7.2% of capital to the negative bear case. The maximum historical drawdown over the last ten years is not supplied, but the recent six-month drawdown proves the risk is not theoretical.

The probability of a permanent loss greater than 50% is below 10%. Adobe's dominant creative position, high switching costs, and subscription base make a permanent half-loss unlikely. The franchise would need to be substantially displaced by AI-native tools, and while that risk is real, it is not the base case. The conclusion from the scenario analysis is that Adobe clears the return hurdle on a probability-weighted basis but offers limited downside protection in the near term. That supports a reduced or no immediate position, with a clear re-entry target.

6. RISK ASSESSMENT

The dominant risk is generative AI disruption. TradingKey's March 10, 2026 commentary describes ongoing concerns that rapid advancement of generative AI tools could disrupt Adobe's traditional software business model. Canva is a formidable rival with over 260 million users on the prosumer front. AI-native platforms challenge Adobe's market dominance by offering simpler, cheaper creative tools. Adobe's response is Firefly, trained on licensed data, and the model-agnostic integration strategy. The risk is that these defenses preserve the professional core but lose the lower end of the market, compressing long-term revenue growth.

The freemium pivot creates a measurable near-term headwind. Trefis reports a freemium ARR headwind of approximately \$500 million, and Adobe lowered ARR guidance. The bull case treats this as a temporary investment to acquire millions of new users. The bear case treats it as the first sign of eroding pricing power and market share loss. The market has already punished the stock for this uncertainty: Adobe raised full-year guidance on June 12, 2026 and still fell 5.7% to \$206.36. Guidance beats do not reassure investors when the strategic direction is unproven.

Leadership succession is a live risk. FinancialContent reports Adobe is grappling with the announced retirement of CEO Shantanu Narayen. Simply Wall St highlights leadership turnover and management continuity as core risks. A CFO transition is also referenced in the 247wallst bear case. When the CEO who led the company through the original cloud transition leaves during a second major transition, the execution risk rises. The market depends on management to convert free users into paid revenue, and that task now falls to a new leadership team.

Regulatory scrutiny adds a layer of legal uncertainty. TradingKey reports scrutiny surrounding past acquisitions and business practices. Adobe's pending acquisition of Semrush Holdings is expected to close in the first half of fiscal 2026, but the research does not provide specific antitrust objections. Past acquisition scrutiny in the software sector has a history of delaying or blocking deals. The risk is not quantified in the supplied data, but it is not zero.

Macro sensitivity is moderate. Adobe's subscription base reduces recession impact relative to transactional software, but Digital Experience revenue depends on enterprise marketing budgets, which are discretionary. The Q1 FY2026 revenue growth of 8.4% by one source sits just above the 8% thesis-changing threshold. A sustained print below 8% would indicate share loss or saturation. The supplied data contains a conflict on Q1 FY2026 revenue: one source reports a beat of \$6.40B versus a \$6.28B estimate, and another reports a miss of \$6.19B versus a \$6.40B estimate. That discrepancy prevents a clean read on the most recent pre-FQ2 quarter, and you should resolve it before committing more capital.

The mitigants are substantial. Adobe holds over 70% of the creative software market, has an A1 credit rating, a debt-to-equity ratio of 47.53%, a free cash flow yield of 9.36%, and a five-year ROIC of 28.00%. The \$25 billion buyback reduces share count and supports EPS. The subscription base provides recurring cash flow even in a downturn. Those factors cap the permanent loss probability below 10%.

The net risk assessment is moderate. The transition risk is real and partially unpriced, but the balance sheet and franchise provide a floor. The stock deserves a hold, not a maximum position, because the downside is not capped tightly enough for a capital-preservation mandate.

7. MANAGEMENT & GOVERNANCE

Management quality is good but no longer excellent. Shantanu Narayen led Adobe through the 2012-2013 Creative Cloud subscription transition, arguably one of the most successful software business model changes in

history. His announced retirement leaves the company without the leader who orchestrated that transformation. Simply Wall St describes the company as managed well, returning almost triple its cost of capital. The last five-year ROIC of 28.00% against a 10.31% cost of capital supports that view.

Capital allocation history is mixed but generally shareholder-friendly. The five-year shares outstanding CAGR of negative 2.32% demonstrates consistent buybacks. The \$25 billion share repurchase authorization, referenced in the July 15, 2026 analyst note that lifted the stock 6.6%, reinforces that commitment. Acquisitions have not all been small: Workfront came in 2020 and Frame.io in 2021. The research does not provide purchase prices or post-acquisition ROIC, so you cannot fully grade the acquisition record. The absence of a dividend means shareholders depend entirely on buybacks and price appreciation for cash return.

Insider activity is neutral to slightly negative. President David Wadhvani exercised 3,024 RSUs on July 15, 2026, with 1,498 shares automatically surrendered at \$224.56 for tax liabilities. A January 15, 2026 Form 4 showed RSU conversions with shares surrendered at \$304.09 to cover taxes. These are routine tax-withholding transactions, not open-market sales initiated for diversification. The research shows no open-market insider purchases, which would be a stronger signal of conviction. The absence of insider buying during the transition is a minor negative.

Institutional ownership is substantial but directionally mixed. BlackRock beneficially owned more than 10% of common stock as of June 30, 2026. In the most recent quarter, 835 institutional investors added shares while 1,726 decreased positions. More institutions left than entered, reflecting the uncertainty around the AI pivot. The segment reporting change in Q1 FY2026 reduces visibility into individual business lines, which reduces the precision of management accountability.

Management and governance do not disqualify Adobe, but they do not add the extra layer of confidence a wealth-preservation investor should want during a transition. The capital allocation is responsible, the insider activity is routine, but the leadership turnover and reduced disclosure create execution uncertainty. Grade management as GOOD.

8. PEER COMPARISON

Metric	ADBE	MSFT	ORCL	SAP	CRM
P/E	16.34x	30.38x	26.45x	29.30x	30.61x
Dividend yield	0%	0.68%	1.30%	1.21%	0.64%
Revenue growth (forecast)	10.51%	16.73%	31.82%	11.10%	11.64%
Debt/equity	47.53%	n/p	n/p	n/p	n/p
Interest coverage	n/p	n/p	n/p	n/p	n/p
FCF margin	n/p	n/p	n/p	n/p	n/p
ROIC	n/p	n/p	n/p	n/p	n/p
5-yr dilution	n/p	n/p	n/p	n/p	n/p
Dividend growth	n/p	n/p	n/p	n/p	n/p

Adobe is the cheapest name in the group on a trailing P/E basis at 16.34x versus a peer range of 26.45x to 30.61x. That discount is meaningful, but it reflects the high uncertainty around Adobe's AI transition and the absence of a dividend. Microsoft, Oracle, SAP, and Salesforce all pay dividends, while Adobe pays none. Oracle pairs the second-highest dividend yield among the peers with the lowest peer P/E and the highest forecast revenue growth at 31.82%. On a capital preservation screen that weighs current income and downside cushion, Oracle screens best among the named peers because the dividend provides a cash return while you wait.

Adobe's advantage is the breadth of its creative moat and its higher structural profitability. The projected operating margin of 46.04% is exceptional for the group, and the ROIC of 28.00% indicates the creative and document franchises extract more economic profit per dollar of invested capital than typical enterprise software peers. The five-year share count reduction of 2.32% is another differentiator, though the peer data do not permit a clean comparison on that metric.

The peer comparison confirms Adobe's quality and valuation discount, but it also highlights the missing income tailwind. For a capital-preservation portfolio that treats dividends as real returns, Adobe must overcome a structural disadvantage: every dollar of expected return depends on price appreciation, which is less certain than a cash dividend. That reinforces the hold judgment until the entry price or transition evidence improves.

9. KEY METRICS SUMMARY

Category	Metric	Value	Source
Price	Current price	\$266.51 / €229.28	Live quote
Valuation	Trailing P/E	15.57x	stockanalysis.com
Valuation	Forward P/E	10.50x	stockanalysis.com
Valuation	P/S	4.36x	stockanalysis.com
Valuation	P/B	9.43x	stockanalysis.com
Valuation	P/FCF	10.68x	stockanalysis.com
Valuation	EV/EBITDA	11.44x	stockanalysis.com
Valuation	PEG	0.75	stockanalysis.com
Profitability	5-yr ROIC	28.00%	Simply Wall St
Profitability	Proj. operating margin	46.04%	Simply Wall St
Growth	5-yr projected EPS CAGR	10.67%	Simply Wall St
Growth	5-yr projected revenue CAGR	8.69%	Simply Wall St
Balance sheet	Debt/equity	47.53%	Financhill
Credit	Moody's rating	A1	Simply Wall St
Capital return	Buyback yield	5.84%	stockanalysis.com
Capital return	5-yr shares CAGR	-2.32%	Simply Wall St

Category	Metric	Value	Source
Capital return	Dividend yield	0%	Financhill
Analyst	Consensus rating	Hold	StockAnalysis
Analyst	Avg price target	\$270.61 - \$276.58	multiple
Analyst	Target low / high	\$190 / \$380	Yahoo Finance
Catalyst	Next earnings	Sept 10, 2026	multiple
Risk	Days to cover	4.2	research summary

10. MONITORING CHECKLIST

Item	Trigger	Action	Frequency
Total revenue growth	Falls below 8% YoY two consecutive quarters	Dive into thesis; re-evaluate	Quarterly
Digital Media ARR	Deceleration toward mid-single digits	Re-evaluate pricing power	Quarterly
Freemium ARR headwind	Exceeds \$500M with no conversion	Reduce retention	Quarterly
Creative MAU conversion	Free-to-paid conversion stays below 10%	Delay entry	Quarterly
AI-first ARR	Falls below \$500M or growth stalls	Review AI monetization	Quarterly
Operating margin	Compresses below 40%	Review cost structure	Quarterly
Shares outstanding	Buyback execution stalls	Reduce per-share tailwind assumption	Quarterly
CEO/CFO transition	Departure without credible successor	Increase risk weight	Event
Semrush acquisition	Antitrust delay or block	Re-assess regulatory risk	Event
Price entry	Stock reaches \$220	Upgrade to BUY	Continuous
Price trim	Stock exceeds \$350 without fundamental improvement	Downgrade	Continuous

11. MARKET EXPECTATIONS & CONSENSUS

The current stock price sits just below the Wall Street consensus target. StockAnalysis reports an average target of \$270.61, about 1.5% above the current \$266.51. Yahoo Finance lists an average of \$276.58, with a low of \$190 and a high of \$380. MarketBeat reports a consensus Hold with 0 Strong Buy, 7 Buy, 21 Hold, and 5 Sell. One year earlier the consensus target was \$475.08, and three months ago it was \$338.15. The target has fallen materially as the AI pivot uncertainty has grown.

The market-implied growth is negative. Tradestie's valuation work calculates that the market is pricing in an annual earnings decline of 5.0% over the next few years, based on a forward P/E of 10.4 versus Adobe's historical average of 12.1. Under the same source's base case using analysts' 12.4% EPS growth and the

current multiple, the fair value would be \$391.10, 42% above the current quote. That gap reflects the difference between the market's current skepticism and a scenario where Adobe executes.

Short interest is moderate. The days-to-cover figure is 4.2 days, and the research summary provides no share count or percent of float. You cannot determine whether short interest is rising or falling, but the figure is not extreme.

The consensus thesis hangs on the freemium strategy. The validating outcome is Creative MAU growth above 70% year over year converting into paid revenue fast enough to offset the \$500 million ARR headwind, AI-first ARR staying on a triple-digit growth path above \$500 million, and the \$25 billion buyback supporting EPS without further ARR guidance cuts. The disappointing outcome is the freemium ARR headwind becoming permanent, CFO transition and execution risk disrupting the plan, pricing power eroding through deferred price hikes, or AI-native competitors taking share.

The recent price action shows the market rewards tangible capital return and monetization reassurance, not just raised revenue guidance. Adobe raised full-year guidance on June 12, 2026 and fell 5.7%. An analyst note emphasizing the raised guidance and the new buyback lifted the stock 6.6% on July 15, 2026.

Forward valuation from the live data shows a forward P/E of 10.50, a PEG of 0.75, and an EV/EBITDA of 11.44. The beta is not supplied in the research packet, so you cannot quantify factor exposure from the provided data. The forward P/E is below the trailing P/E, which reflects expected earnings growth. Versus the software sector average, Adobe screens cheap, but the sector discount is the market's way of pricing the transition risk.

12. KEY BUSINESS DRIVERS

Driver 1: Digital Media ARR growth

Why it matters: This is the core recurring-subscription engine, roughly 70% of revenue, and the leading indicator of pricing power and market share.

Current level: \$19.2 billion annualized as of Q4 FY2025.

Bull threshold: Re-acceleration above 10% YoY with the freemium funnel converting.

Bear threshold: Deceleration toward mid-single digits, confirming share loss to AI-native tools.

Next data point: FQ3 2026 earnings on September 10, 2026.

Driver 2: Creative MAU free-to-paid conversion

Why it matters: The freemium pivot trades near-term ARR for user acquisition; conversion determines whether the trade pays.

Current level: Creative MAU up 70% YoY, exceeding 90 million users.

Bull threshold: Paid conversion of free users visibly accelerates within two to three quarters.

Bear threshold: MAU stays high but paid conversion remains below 10% for multiple quarters.

Next data point: Management ARR and MAU commentary on September 10, 2026.

Driver 3: AI-first ARR

Why it matters: AI monetization is the bull case against the structural decay narrative.

Current level: AI-first ARR tripling to above \$500 million.

Bull threshold: AI-first ARR maintains triple-digit growth above \$500 million.

Bear threshold: AI-first ARR stalls below \$500 million or growth falls back below 50%.

Next data point: FQ3 2026 earnings and full-year guidance.

Driver 4: Operating margin

Why it matters: The projected 46.04% margin is the quality-of-earnings foundation.

Current level: Q4 FY2025 operating profit of \$2.3 billion, up 15.53% YoY.

Bull threshold: Margin holds above 46% while revenue re-accelerates.

Bear threshold: Margin compresses below 40% from AI infrastructure cost, competition, or pricing pressure.

Next data point: Quarterly operating margin disclosures.

Driver 5: Total revenue growth

Why it matters: The headline threshold separating thesis intact from thesis broken.

Current level: Approximately 10.5% in Q4 FY2025, but one conflict-source shows 8.4% in Q1 FY2026.

Bull threshold: Sustained above 10%.

Bear threshold: Sustained below 8% for two consecutive quarters.

Next data point: FQ3 2026 revenue print.

13. PROXY TRACKERS & LEADING INDICATORS

Proxy	Ticker	Relationship	Signal
iShares Expanded Tech-Software ETF	IGV	Correlates with software sector	Bullish if IGV holds its 50-day MA; bearish if it breaks below
Technology Select Sector SPDR	XLK	Broad tech factor exposure	Bearish if XLK underperforms the S&P 500
Microsoft	MSFT	Enterprise software and AI peer	Bullish if MSFT AI revenue accelerates; bearish if it lags
Oracle	ORCL	Peer with dividend and AI data center exposure	Bullish if ORCL holds relative strength; bearish if it diverges

Monitoring rule: If IGV breaks below its 50-day moving average, re-evaluate the Adobe thesis within five trading days. If MSFT and ORCL diverge materially from ADBE without an Adobe-specific event, the divergence may be signaling an Adobe-specific transition issue.

EXIT TRIGGERS

- **FQ3 2026 revenue growth below 8%** or Digital Media ARR decelerating to mid-single digits: downgrade to AVOID and re-evaluate the structural thesis.
- **Freemium ARR headwind persists above \$500 million** for more than three quarters without measurable paid conversion: reduce conviction and required entry price.
- **AI-first ARR stalls below \$500 million** or growth falls below 50%: reassess the bear case probability.

- **CEO or CFO departs without a credible successor** during the transition: raise the execution discount applied to the multiple.
- **Price reaches \$220**: upgrade to BUY at the improved entry, provided solvency metrics remain adequate.
- **Price exceeds \$350 without fundamental improvement**: trim into strength, as the margin of safety has closed.

FINAL RECOMMENDATION

RECOMMENDATION: HOLD / WATCHLIST

Adobe meets the quality gate and the base-case total return hurdle, but the current price of \$266.51 offers only a 3.8% margin of safety to the consensus fair value of \$276.58. The zero dividend removes the income cushion, and the near-term bear case carries a 28.7% potential drawdown to the lowest analyst target of \$190. The probable future return is adequate on a ten-year view, but the wealth-preservation mandate demands a wider downside buffer before committing new capital. Wait for a better entry near \$220 or for post-earnings evidence that the freemium funnel is converting to paid revenue.

ANALYST NOTES

Key Assumptions:

- Trailing EPS of \$17.12 derived from the current price of \$266.51 divided by the trailing P/E of 15.57.
- EPS growth rates of 3.0% bear, 10.67% base, and 12.0% bull.
- Terminal P/E ratios of 12.5 bear, 15.57 base, and 20.0 bull.
- No dividend payments over the forecast period.
- USD to EUR conversion at 0.8603, consistent with the live quote.

Limitations:

- The research packet contains a material conflict on FQ1 FY2026 revenue. One source reports a beat of \$6.40B versus a \$6.28B estimate; another reports a miss of \$6.19B versus a \$6.40B estimate. This report relies primarily on FQ2 2026 and FQ4 2025 figures because they are less conflicted.
- Interest coverage, current ratio, and debt maturity schedule are not supplied. Without those inputs, the solvency rating is ADEQUATE rather than FORTRESS.
- The packet does not provide geographic revenue breakdown, deep_dive_metrics beta, short interest share count, or historical ten-year maximum drawdown.
- One source lists market capitalization at \$78.54B, which appears stale relative to the current \$266.51 price and the P/S implied by fiscal 2024 revenue of \$21.51B. Current market capitalization is not stated because current share count is not supplied.
- No dividend history exists, so the income reliability score component is zero.

Confidence Level: MEDIUM. The business quality and valuation discount are well documented, but the missing solvency inputs, the FQ1 revenue conflict, and the binary earnings event on September 10, 2026 prevent higher conviction.

Report prepared for Moschovakis Capital. This analysis is for informational purposes only.

CONTINUE THE RESEARCH

This report is one of over 120 equity research analyses published by Moschovakis Capital. Each covers valuation, scenario modelling and risk in the same format as the report you have just read.

Full equity research archive

Latest published research

Enquiries and coverage requests

moschovakiscapital.com

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES

This report has been prepared by Moschovakis Capital for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, a solicitation, or an offer to buy or sell any security. The information contained herein is based on sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal. Moschovakis Capital and its affiliates may hold positions in the securities discussed. This document is confidential and intended solely for the recipient. Any reproduction or distribution without prior written consent is prohibited.