PGHN

PGHN

EQUITY RESEARCH REPORT

June 03, 2026

PGHN — PARTNERS GROUP HOLDING AG

Report Date: 2026-06-03

Analyst: Moschovakis Capital Research

■■ DATA INTEGRITY NOTICE

Before any analysis, you need to understand what the research package actually contains, because two of the five data feeds are corrupted or misattributed.

The SEC filings feed returned an analysis of **The Procter & Gamble Company (ticker PG)**, not Partners Group. The feed itself acknowledged the confusion. None of its content (10-K commentary, pricing power narrative, dividend stability claims) applies to PGHN. I have discarded it entirely.

The financials feed declined to provide a numeric five-year series, citing inability to reconstruct CHF figures from filings without risking fabrication. That refusal is correct behavior, but it leaves you without audited revenue, net income, EPS, FCF, or margin data.

The valuation feed declined to provide current multiples for the same reason.

What survives: the Perplexity business overview (with secondary metrics sourced to Morningstar) and the risk assessment (largely industry-level, not company-specific).

The authoritative current price you provided is **$686.40 USD / €591.68 EUR**. This conflicts with the research data, which references PGHN trading around CHF 1,046 on the SIX Swiss Exchange. PGHN's primary listing is Swiss, denominated in CHF, and a single share trades near four figures. A price of $686.40 does not correspond to PGHN's actual share structure. I cannot reconcile the provided price with the security. I will state the provided price where required by template, but I flag this as a material unresolved discrepancy that prevents any valuation or margin-of-safety calculation.

Consequence: I cannot complete Stages 5, 6, and 7 to the standard this framework demands. The absence of audited financials makes the Solvency Check (Stage 2.1), the WP Score, the scenario analysis, and the recommendation impossible to ground in data. I will not fabricate the missing inputs. The framework's first principle is capital preservation, and the framework's data protocol states: never fabricate data not present in the provided inputs.

The honest output is a **conditional AVOID pending verified data**, explained below.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Metric	Value
Recommendation	**AVOID (data-insufficient; not a quality judgment)**
Current Price (as provided)	€591.68 / $686.40 — **UNVERIFIED, conflicts with CHF-denominated lis
Fair Value (Base Case)	**Cannot calculate — no audited financials**

Metric	Value
Margin of Safety	**Cannot calculate**
Target Entry (if HOLD)	**Cannot calculate**

Return Profile	Value
Dividend Yield	~4.0% (Morningstar secondary, unverified)
Expected Dividend Growth	Cannot model
Expected Price Appreciation	Cannot model
Total Expected Return (Base)	Cannot model
Bear Case Total Return	Cannot model
Bull Case Total Return	Cannot model
Probability-Weighted Return	Cannot model

Risk Assessment	Value
Wealth Preservation Score	**Cannot compute (missing balance sheet inputs)**
Downside Protection Score	**Cannot compute (no bear-case earnings)**
Quality Score	**Partial only**
Risk Level	**ELEVATED (by business model; unconfirmed by data)**
Probability of >50% Loss	**Cannot quantify**
Recession Profile	**Unknown — no recession performance data supplied**

One-Line Thesis:

Partners Group looks like a high-return, asset-light private-markets manager with a plausible moat, but the research package contains no audited financials and a current price that does not match the security, so no preservation-grade investment decision can be made.

INVESTMENT THESIS (Conditional)

Partners Group is a Swiss-listed, pure-play private-markets asset manager running roughly four verticals: private equity, private credit, real estate, and infrastructure. The economics that an asset manager of this type produces are genuinely attractive for a preservation mandate when they hold up. Management fees recur off committed capital locked into closed-end vehicles with 10-plus-year lives, which creates real switching costs and a stable revenue floor. The secondary data points to normalized ROE near 52% and ROIC near 25%, which, if accurate, mark a business that compounds capital well above its cost of capital. That is the profile you want.

The problem is twofold, and it stops the analysis before it can reach a buy. First, the business model carries a structural fragility that this mandate treats as a primary concern, not a footnote. A private-markets manager earns lumpy performance fees that swing with exit markets, and it values illiquid assets using fair-value models rather than observable prices. The risk feed cites the Financial Stability Board's May 2026 warning that private credit, now $1.5–2 trillion globally, has never been tested through a severe downturn. Partners Group's earnings depend on fundraising, realizations, and marks that can all freeze or reset together in a credit contraction. That is exactly the kind of correlated downside the framework exists to screen out, and you cannot dismiss it without recession-performance data, which the package does not contain.

Second, and decisively, you have no audited numbers to test any of this against. There is no five-year revenue series, no net income, no EPS, no free cash flow, no debt-to-equity, no interest coverage you can verify against a filing. The Solvency Check is the most critical gate in this framework, and it cannot be opened without the balance sheet. The current price you were handed (€591.68) does not match a security that trades near CHF 1,046 on its home exchange, which means even the starting point of a valuation is broken. When you cannot answer "how much can I lose," the framework instructs you to stop. I am stopping.

This is not a verdict on Partners Group's quality. With clean data, this firm could plausibly clear the hurdle. It is a verdict on the information you have in front of you, which is insufficient to commit capital responsibly.

---

1. BUSINESS QUALITY ASSESSMENT

What the surviving data supports:

- **Business model:** Pure-play private-markets manager. Recurring management fees form the stable base; performance fees add cyclical upside. Solutions-oriented, with bespoke mandates, closed-end funds, and a growing semi-liquid retail channel.
- **Sector classification (Stage 1):** Financial Services / Asset Management. Understandable. Not in secular decline; private markets have grown for decades. **Moderately to highly cyclical** in earnings, because performance fees and AUM marks move with credit and equity cycles. Under the framework, a cyclical earnings profile requires fortress balance sheet evidence to proceed, which is missing.
- **Tailwinds:** Opening of private markets to individual investors; the BlackRock distribution partnership (2024–2025) extends reach into wealth channels at low capital cost.
- **Headwinds:** Fee compression from competition, regulatory scrutiny of private markets, untested private-credit stress.

Stage 1 Verdict: CONTINUE on comprehensibility and secular standing, but with the cyclicality flag raised, which downstream stages cannot clear due to missing data.

---

2. FINANCIAL FORTRESS ANALYSIS

This is where the analysis fails.

Metric	Threshold	PGHN Value	Status
Debt-to-Equity	<1.0x	**Not provided**	Cannot assess
Interest Coverage	>5.0x	~44x (Morningstar secondary, unverified)	Suggestive only

Metric	Threshold	PGHN Value	Status
Current Ratio	>1.5x	~1.5 (secondary, unverified)	Suggestive only
Free Cash Flow	Positive 4/5 yrs	**Not provided**	Cannot assess
Debt Maturity Schedule	No >30% cliff	**Not provided**	Cannot assess
Cash as % of Total Debt	>20%	**Not provided**	Cannot assess

The secondary figures (interest coverage ~44x, current ratio ~1.5) hint at a conservatively financed business, but they come from a data vendor cited inside a Perplexity summary, not from the audited filing. The framework does not permit a FORTRESS or ADEQUATE rating on unverified third-hand metrics.

Solvency Assessment: UNVERIFIABLE. Under the framework, an unverifiable solvency position functions as a disqualifier, because you cannot run the 30%-revenue-decline stress test without the income statement and debt schedule.

Earnings Quality (2.2), Dilution (2.3), ROIC (2.5): None can be computed from supplied data. Secondary ROIC ~25% is suggestive but unverified.

---

3. DIVIDEND ANALYSIS

Secondary data indicates a ~4.0% dividend yield and ~5.4% total shareholder yield (dividends plus modest buybacks). The dividend has reportedly trended upward, subject to performance-fee volatility.

Stress test (the relevant one): A private-markets manager's performance fees collapse in a frozen exit market. If a meaningful share of distributions historically rode on performance fees, the dividend is more vulnerable than the headline 4% yield implies. The package contains no payout ratio, no FCF coverage, and no dividend history through 2008 or 2020. I cannot confirm sustainability.

Dividend Sustainability: UNVERIFIABLE.

---

4. VALUATION ANALYSIS

Not possible.

- No verified current multiples (P/E, EV/EBITDA, P/FCF, P/B).
- The provided price (€591.68) does not match the security's CHF-denominated share structure (~CHF 1,046 per share per research data).
- No normalized earnings to anchor a fair value.

A margin-of-safety calculation requires a price that matches the asset and earnings that come from a filing. Neither exists here. **Valuation: NOT COMPUTABLE.**

---

5. SCENARIO ANALYSIS

Not possible. Bear, base, and bull cases each require a revenue and EPS series plus historical margins for the assumptions. The financials feed explicitly declined to provide these, correctly, rather than fabricate them. Without them, any price targets or CAGR figures I produced would be invented numbers wearing a table. I will not produce them.

---

6. RISK ASSESSMENT

The risk feed was largely industry-level but identified the relevant exposures for a firm of this type:

- **Valuation/mark risk:** Illiquid assets carried at fair-value model estimates, sensitive to deteriorating comparables.
- **Liquidity mismatch:** Semi-liquid retail vehicles holding illiquid assets is a known fragility if redemptions spike.
- **Performance-fee cyclicality:** Earnings depend on realizations and exit markets.
- **Systemic private-credit risk:** FSB (May 2026) flags untested private credit through a severe downturn, with deepening bank-insurer-PE interconnection.
- **Regulatory:** Rising oversight of private markets, ESG disclosure, fiduciary obligations.

None of these is a company-specific allegation. All of them are reasons a preservation mandate demands verified balance-sheet strength and recession-performance history before committing. Both are absent.

Risk Level: ELEVATED by business model, unconfirmed by data. Probability of >50% loss: unquantifiable.

---

7. MANAGEMENT & GOVERNANCE

Secondary data describes a 1996-founded partnership culture, Swiss listing and governance, broad institutional ownership, organic-growth bias, conservative leverage, and rising dividends supplemented by selective buybacks. Morningstar reportedly assigns explicit moat and capital-allocation ratings (labels truncated in the source). This reads favorably but rests entirely on secondary characterization, not primary filings or verified compensation/dilution figures. **Provisional: GOOD, pending verification.**

---

8. PEER COMPARISON

Cannot be performed to framework standard. Named peers (KKR, EQT, Blackstone, Apollo, Carlyle) are correct competitors, but no comparative metrics (D/E, coverage, payout, ROIC, dilution, valuation-vs-history) were supplied for either PGHN or peers. The Wealth Preservation Quality Score requires these inputs and therefore cannot be calculated.

---

9. KEY METRICS SUMMARY

Item	Status
Audited revenue / net income / EPS / FCF	**MISSING**
Debt-to-equity, debt maturity, cash position	**MISSING**
Verified current price matching the security	**CONFLICTING / INVALID**
Verified valuation multiples	**MISSING**
Recession performance history (2008, 2020)	**MISSING**
Dividend payout / coverage ratios	**MISSING**
SEC/regulatory filing review	**WRONG COMPANY (P&G returned)**
Business model, moat, competitive set	Available (secondary)

---

10. MONITORING CHECKLIST

Before this name can be re-analyzed, obtain:

Required Input	Source
FY2020–2024 consolidated income statement (CHF)	Partners Group Annual Reports / FMP
Net income, EPS, EBIT, operating cash flow, capex	Annual Reports / FMP
Debt-to-equity, interest coverage, debt maturity schedule	FMP / Annual Report
Share count 5-year history (dilution)	yfinance / FMP
Dividend payout ratio, FCF coverage, history through 2008/2020	FMP / yfinance
Correct current price in CHF on SIX (XSWX)	SIX / yfinance
Verified current multiples vs 5Y/10Y history	FMP / yfinance
Recession drawdown and dividend action 2008/2020	yfinance / Annual Reports
Correct EDGAR/SIX regulatory filings (not P&G)	SIX issuer filings

---

EXIT TRIGGERS

Not applicable. No position is recommended.

FINAL RECOMMENDATION

RECOMMENDATION: AVOID (data-insufficient)

This is an AVOID on information grounds, not a quality judgment against Partners Group. The framework's absolute requirements cannot be tested:

- [ ] Bear case total return ≥ 0% — **cannot test**
- [ ] Base case total return ≥ 7% — **cannot test**
- [ ] Solvency: FORTRESS or ADEQUATE — **unverifiable**
- [ ] Dividend sustainability: SOLID or SUSTAINABLE — **unverifiable**
- [ ] Probability of >50% permanent loss <10% — **cannot quantify**

When you cannot answer "how much can I lose," you do not buy. Combined with a current price that does not match the security, committing capital here would violate the preservation mandate.

What would change the assessment: A clean data set (audited CHF financials FY2020–2024, verified balance sheet and debt schedule, correct SIX-denominated price, recession-performance history, and dividend coverage detail). With those, this name plausibly merits a full re-analysis and could clear the hurdle given its asset-light economics and recurring fee base.

ANALYST NOTES

Key Assumptions: None load-bearing, because I declined to substitute assumptions for missing audited data.

Limitations:

- SEC filings feed returned The Procter & Gamble Company, not Partners Group. Discarded.
- Financials feed provided no numeric series (correctly refusing to fabricate).
- Valuation feed provided no current multiples.
- Provided current price (€591.68 / $686.40) conflicts with PGHN's CHF-denominated Swiss listing (~CHF 1,046/share in research data). Unresolved.
- Surviving content (business overview, risk themes) is secondary and partly industry-level.

Confidence Level: LOW — driven entirely by data integrity failures, not by the underlying business. The responsible action under this framework is to refuse a capital commitment and request corrected inputs rather than manufacture a decision on broken data.

Report prepared for Moschovakis Capital. This analysis is for informational purposes only.

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES

CONTINUE THE RESEARCH

This report is one of over 120 equity research analyses published by Moschovakis Capital. Each covers valuation, scenario modelling and risk in the same format as the report you have just read.

Full equity research archive

Latest published research

Enquiries and coverage requests

moschovakiscapital.com