



Noble Corporation Plc

NE

EQUITY RESEARCH REPORT

May 04, 2026

NE — Noble Corporation Plc

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Metric	Value
Recommendation	**AVOID**
Current Price	\$50.93
Fair Value (Base Case)	\$42.00
Margin of Safety	-17.5% (price exceeds fair value)
Target Entry (if HOLD)	\$32.00

Return Profile	Value
Dividend Yield	3.9% (\$2.00 annual)
Expected Dividend Growth	-5% to flat (cyclical risk)
Expected Price Appreciation	0% to 3%
Total Expected Return (Base)	4.5% CAGR
Bear Case Total Return	-8.5% CAGR
Bull Case Total Return	14% CAGR
Probability-Weighted Return	3.6% CAGR

Risk Assessment	Value
Wealth Preservation Score	38 / 100
Downside Protection Score	30 / 100
Quality Score	45 / 100
Risk Level	**ELEVATED**
Probability of >50% Loss	~20%
Recession Profile	**VULNERABLE**

One-Line Thesis:

Noble operates a high-quality offshore drilling fleet at the peak of an oil services cycle, but cyclical, declining 2026 guidance, and a dividend that the company has zero history of defending through downturns disqualify it

from a wealth preservation mandate.

INVESTMENT THESIS

You are looking at an offshore driller trading at \$50.93 with a 3.9% dividend yield, a \$7.5 billion backlog, and a balance sheet that screens better than peers. The temptation is to call this a quality income vehicle. The framework rejects that conclusion.

Noble emerged from bankruptcy in 2021. The current entity has no recession history. Management's guidance for 2026 already shows revenue declining from \$3.26 billion to \$2.8-3.0 billion and EBITDA falling from \$1.10 billion to \$940-1,020 million. This is a peak-cycle company guiding to a softer year, before any actual oil price shock arrives. Fitch maintains a BB- credit rating, which is sub-investment grade and tells you the bond market does not view this balance sheet as a fortress.

The dividend is the heart of the wealth preservation case, and it fails. A \$0.50 quarterly dividend at \$2.00 annualized requires roughly \$310 million in cash distributions against 2024 free cash flow of \$80 million and Q4 2025 free cash flow of \$35 million. The company is funding the dividend partly from working capital and divestiture proceeds, not sustainable FCF. In a 2015-2016 style oil downturn, the dividend gets cut. Period.

The bear case is not theoretical. From 2014 to 2020, the offshore drilling sector experienced a 90%+ peak-to-trough drawdown across virtually every operator, including pre-bankruptcy Noble, Transocean, Valaris, Diamond, and Seadrill. Every one of these companies either went bankrupt or restructured. The industry's structural problem is that drilling assets cost \$750 million each, depreciate slowly, and operate in a market where two years of low oil prices destroy a decade of equity value. A Wealth Preservation framework cannot accept a 20% probability of permanent capital loss greater than 50%, which is what offshore drillers have demonstrated they can produce.

What would change the assessment: a price below \$32 (offering bear-case downside protection through valuation), a dividend cut that resets expectations (paradoxically improving the long-term setup), or a multi-year contract structure that locks in revenue through any conceivable downturn. None of these conditions exist today.

1. BUSINESS QUALITY ASSESSMENT

Noble owns 19 floating rigs (15 drillships, 4 semi-submersibles) and 13 jackups, with the floater fleet representing one of the youngest in the industry. Revenue comes from dayrate contracts with majors (ExxonMobil, bp, Aker BP), national oil companies, and independents. The company secured roughly \$1.3 billion in new awards since October 2025, building backlog to \$7.5 billion.

Moat assessment: The capital intensity of new rig construction (>\$750 million per drillship) creates a real entry barrier, and Noble's fleet quality enables premium dayrates. But the moat is industry-wide, not company-specific. When global rig demand falls, every operator's premium fleet competes for the same shrinking work pool, and dayrates collapse for everyone. This is structural cyclical wear wearing the costume of a moat.

Threat assessment: ELEVATED. Energy transition policies, decarbonization pressure on majors, and oil price volatility all sit directly on Noble's revenue line. The 2026 guidance reduction is the company telling you the cycle is rolling over.

- Primary Moat: Capital intensity / fleet quality (industry-shared, durability MEDIUM)
- Moat Preservation Confidence: **LOW**

2. FINANCIAL FORTRESS ANALYSIS

Metric	Value	Threshold	Pass/Fail
Debt-to-Equity	0.44	<1.0	Pass
Total Debt	\$1.9B	—	—
Cash	\$663M	—	—
Net Debt / EBITDA	1.1x	<2.5x	Pass
Interest Coverage (est.)	~5x	>5x	Marginal
Current Ratio	1.75	>1.5	Pass
FCF Positive 5/5 years	No (2020-2022 unclear/negative)Yes		**Fail**
Credit Rating (Fitch)	BB-	IG preferred	**Fail**
Cash as % of Debt	35%	>20%	Pass

The headline metrics look acceptable, but the credit rating tells the truer story. BB- is junk-rated. The rating agencies see what surface metrics hide: a business model where current cash flows can evaporate within 18 months of an oil price shock.

Stress test (revenue -30% for 2 years): Revenue falls from ~\$3.0B to ~\$2.1B. EBITDA margins compress from 34% to ~20% (history shows margins go negative in deep downturns). EBITDA falls from \$1.0B to ~\$420M. Interest expense ~\$140M. Cash flow before capex covers debt service but leaves nothing for the \$310M dividend. **Dividend gets cut.** Possible equity raise if the downturn extends beyond 2 years.

Solvency Assessment: ADEQUATE (not Fortress, given junk rating and unproven through-cycle resilience)

3. DIVIDEND ANALYSIS

Metric	Value	Assessment
Current Yield	3.9%	Attractive on surface
Annual Dividend	\$2.00	\$0.50 quarterly
Years of Consecutive Dividend	~3 (since Q4 2022)	**Unproven**
2024 FCF	\$80M	Insufficient
2025 Operating CF	\$952M	Strong
2025 Capex	\$520M	Rising to \$615-665M in 2026

Metric	Value	Assessment
Implied 2026 FCF	\$275-405M	Tight cover
Dividend Cost (~\$310M)	—	Eats most of FCF
FCF Payout Ratio (2024)	388%	Unsustainable
FCF Payout Ratio (2026E)	~75-110%	Marginal

The dividend has been paid for roughly 14 quarters. The company has never defended this dividend through a real cycle downturn. 2024 free cash flow of \$80 million did not cover the dividend; the gap was funded by divestitures (\$360M jackup sale) and working capital. 2026 capex is rising to \$615-665 million for the Noble Deliverer reactivation, further compressing free cash flow.

Stress test: If 2027 EBITDA drops 30% from current levels to ~\$700M, capex stays at \$400M, and interest stays at \$140M, you have ~\$160M of free cash flow against a \$310M dividend. The math forces a 50%+ cut.

Dividend Sustainability: AT RISK

4. VALUATION ANALYSIS

Metric	Current	5Y Avg	Assessment
Trailing P/E	24.7	14.5	**Premium (+70%)**
Forward P/E	38.4	—	Reflects 2026 EPS decline
EV/EBITDA	6.0-9.4	5-7	At/above range
P/FCF	14.0	—	Reasonable on TTM
P/B	1.23	—	Reasonable
Dividend Yield	3.9%	—	Attractive but at risk

Market cap \$5.5B, enterprise value \$7.0B against \$3.26B revenue and \$1.16B TTM EBITDA. The trailing P/E sits 70% above its five-year average. The forward P/E of 38x reflects management's own guidance for declining 2026 earnings. You are paying a premium multiple for a company at the top of its cycle, guiding lower.

Fair value calculation:

- Normalized through-cycle EBITDA (blending peak and trough): ~\$700M
- Apply 6x EV/EBITDA: \$4.2B EV
- Less \$1.26B net debt: \$2.94B equity value
- ~160M shares: **\$18.40 per share through-cycle fair value**
- Current cycle peak fair value at 6x current EBITDA: ~\$42

The gap between \$50.93 spot and \$42 cycle-peak fair value is a 17% overvaluation. Against through-cycle normalized fair value of \$18-20, the overvaluation exceeds 60%.

Valuation: FULL to EXPENSIVE | Margin of Safety: NEGATIVE

5. SCENARIO ANALYSIS

BEAR CASE (35% weight, raised from 25% given cycle position):

- Oil drops below \$55/bbl, majors cut offshore capex 25%
- 2027-2028 revenue declines to \$2.2B, EBITDA margin compresses to 20%
- EBITDA falls to ~\$440M, dividend cut 75% to \$0.50 annual
- EV/EBITDA contracts to 5x = \$2.2B EV - \$1.4B net debt = \$800M equity
- 10-year price target: \$20
- 10-year total return CAGR (with reduced dividends): **-8.5%**

BASE CASE (45% weight):

- Cycle moderates but does not crash, 2026 guidance (\$940-1,020M EBITDA) holds
- 2027 inflection per management, EBITDA recovers to \$1.1B
- Through-cycle fair value \$42, modest dividend growth
- 10-year price target: \$58 (modest appreciation)
- 10-year total return CAGR: **4.5%**

BULL CASE (20% weight):

- Sustained \$80+ oil, deepwater renaissance, dayrates exceed \$500K
- EBITDA expands to \$1.4B by 2028
- Multiple expansion to 8x EV/EBITDA
- 10-year price target: \$95
- 10-year total return CAGR: **14%**

Scenario	Price Target	Total CAGR	Weight	Contribution
Bear	\$20	-8.5%	35%	-3.0%
Base	\$58	4.5%	45%	2.0%
Bull	\$95	14.0%	20%	2.8%
Expected		**1.8%**		

Probability-weighted expected return of 1.8% CAGR fails the 7% hurdle by a wide margin and barely beats inflation alone.

6. RISK ASSESSMENT

Permanent capital loss probability: ~20% over 10 years. The offshore drilling industry produced multiple bankruptcies in the 2014-2020 cycle. The current Noble entity emerged from one of those bankruptcies. Industry concentration in oil price-sensitive end markets and high operating leverage make permanent impairment a real, repeating risk.

Maximum drawdown estimation:

- Pre-bankruptcy Noble peak-to-trough 2014-2020: -100% (wiped out)
- Post-emergence, no full cycle observed
- Bear scenario from current \$50.93: -60% to \$20

Specific risks:

- Oil price shock (highest probability)
- Customer concentration: ExxonMobil represents significant backlog
- Diamond Offshore integration risk (closed September 2024)
- Energy transition reducing long-term offshore demand
- Refinancing risk on \$1.9B debt at junk rating

Recession Profile: VULNERABLE

7. MANAGEMENT & GOVERNANCE

Management has executed competently in the post-bankruptcy era. The Diamond Offshore acquisition (closed September 2024) added scale at what appears to be reasonable pricing. The capital return program (\$1.3B since Q4 2022 via dividends and buybacks) signals confidence, though the framework views aggressive capital return at cycle peaks as a yellow flag rather than a green one.

Capital allocation observations:

- Buybacks at peak valuations: yes, this has occurred during 2024-2025
- Acquisitions: Diamond integration ongoing, too early to judge ROIC
- Dividends: reinstated post-bankruptcy, no through-cycle history
- Capex discipline: 2026 capex rising to \$615-665M, partly opportunistic

Management Quality: GOOD
Capital Allocation Track Record: ACCEPTABLE (insufficient cycle history to call STRONG)

8. PEER COMPARISON

Metric	Noble (NE)	Transocean (RIG)	Valaris (VAL)	Best for Preservation
Net Debt/EBITDA	1.1x	~3.5x	~1.5x	NE
Credit Rating	BB-	B-	B+	NE
Dividend Yield	3.9%	0%	0%	NE
Backlog	\$7.5B	\$9.0B	\$4.5B	RIG
Fleet Quality	High	High	Medium	NE/RIG
Through-cycle Survival	Bankrupted 2020	Survived 2020 (barely)	Bankrupted 2020	RIG

Noble screens as the best balance sheet and the only meaningful dividend payer in offshore drilling. This makes it the highest-quality name in a low-quality industry. The framework's verdict: best of a bad cohort does not equal a wealth preservation candidate. The whole sector is disqualified before peer ranking matters.

9. KEY METRICS SUMMARY

Wealth Preservation Score Component	Score
Balance Sheet Fortress (40 max)	22
Income Reliability (30 max)	8
Capital Efficiency (15 max)	4
Valuation (15 max)	4
Total WP Score	**38 / 100**

Absolute Requirements	Result
Bear case total return \geq 0%	**FAIL** (-8.5%)
Base case total return \geq 7%	**FAIL** (4.5%)
Solvency: Fortress or Adequate	Pass (Adequate)
Dividend Sustainability: Rock Solid or Sustainable	**FAIL** (At Risk)
Probability of >50% loss < 10%	**FAIL** (~20%)

Five of seven absolute requirements fail. One failure triggers AVOID.

10. MONITORING CHECKLIST

If the position were ever to be reconsidered, these are the conditions that would trigger re-review:

Trigger	Action
Price below \$32	Re-run framework; potential margin of safety reaches base case
Brent oil sustained below \$60 for 6+ months	Confirm bear case; remain AVOID
Dividend cut announced	Paradoxically positive long-term; re-evaluate at lower price
2026 EBITDA guidance achieved at upper end (\$1.02B)	Marginal upgrade to HOLD if priced below \$40
Credit upgrade to investment grade (BBB-)	Reassess solvency rating
Fleet utilization drops below 75%	Confirm cycle downturn; expect dividend cut

Trigger	Action
Capex guidance raised >\$700M	Negative; further dividend pressure

FINAL RECOMMENDATION

RECOMMENDATION: AVOID

Noble Corporation fails the Wealth Preservation framework on multiple absolute requirements. The bear case produces meaningful negative returns. The base case fails to clear the 7% inflation-plus hurdle. The dividend lacks through-cycle history and is mathematically vulnerable to a downturn the company itself is guiding toward in 2026. The probability of >50% permanent capital loss exceeds 10% based on the industry's recent bankruptcy history.

You are paying \$50.93 for a company at the apparent peak of its cycle, with a 38x forward P/E that already reflects management's guided earnings decline. The 3.9% dividend yield is real today and unlikely to be real through a downturn.

This is not a quality preservation vehicle. It is a cyclical equity with a temporarily high dividend. A 4% HYS A offers a better risk-adjusted return than the probability-weighted 1.8% CAGR this analysis produces.

What would change the recommendation: Price below \$32 with no fundamental deterioration, or a dividend cut that brings expectations in line with through-cycle reality. Watch but do not own.

ANALYST NOTES

Key Assumptions:

- Oil prices average \$65-75 in base case
- Through-cycle EBITDA normalizes near \$700-800M
- Dividend cut probability ~50% within 5 years
- No major refinancing crisis assumed

Limitations:

- Post-bankruptcy entity lacks full-cycle data
- Diamond integration synergies uncertain
- Backlog quality (cancellation risk) not fully visible from public data
- 2026 guidance subject to oil price assumptions not disclosed

Confidence Level: HIGH — The conclusion holds across reasonable assumption ranges. Even generous bull-case weighting cannot lift probability-weighted returns above 6%, below the 7% hurdle.

Report prepared for Moschovakis Capital. This analysis is for informational purposes only.

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